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  A core proposition of mainstream economic theory is that 
labor is a commodity whose properties are not essentially 
different from any other.  From this formative premise the 
labor market is represented as just another market, from which 
it follows that it can be analyzed in the same manner as any 
other salable commodity -- with a straightforward application 
of the theory of supply and demand.1  To the extent that other 
considerations matter they are thought to be in the domain of 
“normative economics" which most practicing economists take to 
be a preanalytic set of attitudes, prejudices, or agendas that 
are to be excluded from theoretical and scientific analysis. 
  This state of affairs is somewhat anomalous in light of 
the fact that labor economics has long held an independent 
status as a distinct field of scholarship (Kaufman 1993; 
McNulty 1980).  Even today the economics profession features a 
large contingent of scholars who identify themselves as “labor 
economists.”  Annually, numerous books, academic journals, and 
conferences are devoted to the study of the labor market.  
Only agricultural and financial markets have consistently 
drawn comparable interest from the economics profession over 
the years. 
  The following chapter will inquire into some of the 
unique aspects of labor that generate these conundrums,   3
despite implicit or explicit denials that the labor market has 
idiosyncratic qualities that can be traced to the specific 
attributes of the commodity exchanged there.  Stated simply, 
this chapter will examine a few of the qualities that make 
labor inherently different from other marketable commodities 
such as broccoli, fresh fruit, or bags of concrete.  Everyone 
recognizes that there is a difference in substance -- labor is 
human and for this reason different in form and ethical status 
from a bag of concrete.  What is at issue is the proposition 
that labor, considered as a salable commodity, embodies some 
qualities or features that fundamentally modify the market 
process.2  The specific qualities of labor to be covered 
include the following: (1) Labor cannot be separated from its 
providers. (2) Labor cannot be stored. (3) Labor embodies the 
quality of self-consciousness. (4) Labor is the one "factor of 
production" that most of us wish, in the end, to see well-
compensated.  A few concluding remarks will close this 
chapter. 
 
Labor Cannot be Separated from its Provider 
 
  Physically, legally, ethically, and economically labor is 
a commodity that, by its nature, cannot be readily separated 
from its provider.  In almost every instance, the employee 
must be present to deliver the contracted-for labor services.  
This fact alone makes labor unique, and even more so in 
countries that value human rights.  Stated simply, when buying   4
labor the purchaser enters, at least in part, into a caretaker 
relationship with the purveyor of that labor -- the worker’s 
person.  Decisions that firms may, or may not, make with 
regard to the health and safety of its workforce necessarily 
have lasting implications for the workers they hire during and 
well after the conclusion of a particular task or employment 
contract (Commons and Andrews 1916, 1-34; Commons 1924, 283-
312). 
  It follows from this that individual laborers and, in the 
event of widespread suffrage, the state, each and severally 
have a direct and ongoing interest in the conditions under 
which labor is employed.  One can reasonably conclude, as did 
John Commons, that the state, through contract and labor law, 
is effectively a third party to every labor contract (Chasse 
1986, 767-69).  Enlightened employers, who are more inclined 
to view a healthy, educated, and largely content labor force 
as a source of enhanced productivity, also have an interest in 
the protection of this resource.  Not surprisingly, regulation 
of the workplace and the labor contract represent some of the 
first, and most important, examples of state intervention in 
the market economy (Commons and Andrews 1916; Millis and 
Montgomery 1938; Seager 1907, 412-433). 
  By contrast with labor, consider the circumstances of the 
vast majority of commodities that are traded in markets.  
Broccoli, to take one example, can be exchanged between 
persons with few legal encumbrances pertaining to it.  The 
purchaser of a quantity of broccoli, by establishing a legal   5
claim over it, has what in law is termed a "right of exclusive 
disposal."  She might eat it, let it mold in the refrigerator, 
or present it as a gift to someone else, without violating the 
rights of the broccoli in question or those of its original or 
previous owners. 
  Thankfully, modern statutes no longer allow such 
"freedom" when labor is purchased.  Labor, but not the 
laborer, can be purchased for a short period only.  The 
options open to the purchaser of labor are much narrower than 
in the case of broccoli.  The extent of the purchasers' rights 
over the use to which this labor is put are constrained by 
moral sanction, the Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration (OSHA), tort law, numerous state and federal 
regulations, and even criminal statutes.  While the past 
twenty-five years have seen some erosion in the extent that 
employers feel constrained with regard to their treatment of 
their employees, the legal system, and most thinking people, 
still maintain that a profound difference exists between labor 
and other marketable commodities. 
 
Labor Cannot be Stored 
 
  A second assumption underlying the received theory of the 
labor market is the idea that everyone will be able to enter 
into a successful exchange of their labor for some price, 
however low.  Moreover, mainstream theory implicitly posits 
that the “penalty” exacted for a failure to consummate an   6
exchange is that one is left in the economic condition and 
circumstance that existed prior to one’s decision to accept or 
reject a particular contract.  Drawing upon this crucial if 
rarely articulated assumption, economists typically, almost 
instinctively, conclude that a “free exchange” between 
consenting adults “must” make everyone better off.  From this 
premise it follows that if market participants decide that 
they do not wish to accept the current market price for their 
goods, they have the option to either consume their own goods 
or "store" them at a very low cost.  This is what is implicit 
behind the “free entry and exit” assumption that is at the 
cornerstone of the theory of competitive markets promulgated 
in mainstream economic theory (Prasch 1995). 
  For labor the situation is not so straight-forward.  To 
begin with, labor cannot be stored by the employee.  A day of 
work missed cannot be readily recovered since the temporal 
dimension of life means that our past is, well, in the past.  
By contrast broccoli, while perishable, can be stored for a 
period of time.  The owner even has the option to refrigerate 
or freeze it and thereby greatly extend its useful qualities 
as a marketable commodity. 
  In addition, people have needs that must be met.  To 
grasp the importance of this observation “needs” must be 
distinguished from “wants” or "desires."  In conventional 
usage, wants have a whimsical quality to them, such as “I want 
an ice cream cone or a pink Cadillac.”  Needs, on the other 
hand, suggest a sense of urgency.  At the most basic level I   7
need food, water, clothing, and shelter if I am to survive.  
Moreover, in a complex social system such as the United 
States, our needs are more extensive than merely food, water, 
clothing, and shelter.  If I am to participate in such a 
society my needs will, in all likelihood, include a minimal 
level of personal grooming, clothing consistent with the norms 
of my workplace, and access to certain modes of communication, 
including literacy, a telephone, and in an increasing number 
of workplaces, the internet. 
  Crucially, if the needs specific to retaining my social 
status and relationships are not met, the penalty is greater 
than a simple failure to achieve a desired level of happiness 
or personal fulfillment.  There is a good chance that I will 
be unable to maintain my current capacity for social and 
economic interaction.  Various penalties, including the loss 
of my job, can be expected to occur if I cannot meet the 
cultural and consumption norms and standards of a given work 
or social environment.  In short, our needs place us, as 
social and physical beings, under constraints that are more 
pressing than is suggested by the term "wants."  Economists 
are simply in error when they insist that virtually all needs 
can be reduced to the category “wants” and that satisfying our 
needs necessarily serves to increase “utility.”3  In the case 
of needs, we must meet them to remain at our previous level of 
satisfaction since a failure to do so may lead to a 
deterioration in our health, well-being, and economic 
capacity.  By contrast, unless we are children, a failure to   8
fulfill our wants leaves us where we were before we considered 
acquiring the good in question (Frankfurt 1984; Levine 1988, 
1-33; Lutz and Lux 1979, 3-75; Prasch 1999b, 2003; Sen 1999, 
87-110). 
  While it is true that employers and owners of companies 
are also people who have needs, in a world without full 
employment they have the option of withdrawing from any given 
labor contract and hiring someone else.  Even in the event of 
a tight labor market, employers have more options.  Depending 
on the specifics of their business, they could relocate their 
firms or move into a different market.  If all else fails, 
employers always have the option of dissolving their 
businesses and becoming laborers themselves.  It follows that 
employers are at least two transactions, first selling their 
wares and then selling their labor, away from experiencing 
unmet needs.  It follows that needy persons without assets 
will generally do worse when they are bargaining with persons 
or entities who are trying to satisfy their wants (Pound 1909; 
Prasch 1995; Hale 1923, 1943). 
  That workers must exchange their labor for wages in order 
to meet their needs, and the potential for physical and mental 
deterioration in the event that such an exchange does not 
occur, has long been understood by economists.  The difference 
between then and now is that this phenomena was once 
considered an important element of labor economics.  In the 
words of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, “The mere fact that the man 
is without occupation, and without income, even if he is not   9
yet actually in want, means in the great majority of cases, 
that he is suffering degeneration in skill, in health and in 
character, and that he is running grave risk of 
demoralisation” (Webb and Webb, 1911, 139).4  This idea also 
played a fundamental role in Karl Marx’s understanding of the 
labor market as a locus of exploitation: 
<<BEGINEXT 
For the transformation of money into capital, 
therefore, the owner of money must find the free 
worker available on the commodity-market; and this 
worker must be free in the double-sense that as a 
free individual he can dispose of his labour-power 
as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, 
he has no other commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid 
of them, he is free of all the objects needed for 
the realization of his labour-power (Marx 1977, 272-
273). 
<<ENDEXT 
Karl Polanyi also stressed the institutional and sociological 
framework behind the establishment of the "modern" labor 
market: 
<<BEGINEXT 
This effect of the establishment of a labor market 
is conspicuously apparent in colonial regions today.  
The natives are to be forced to make a living by 
selling their labor.  To this end their traditional 
institutions must be destroyed, and prevented from 
re-forming, since, as a rule, the individual in 
primitive society is not threatened by starvation 
unless the community as a whole is in a like 
predicament ... It is the absence of the threat of 
individual starvation which makes primitive society, 
in a sense, more human than market economy, and at 
the same time less economic (Polanyi 1944, 163-164). 
<<ENDEXT 
  Prior to the “analytic revolution” that swept through the 
economics profession of post-war America, these issues were   10
more widely understood in this country too.  An example is 
John Bates Clark who observed that, “Hunger-discipline 
disqualifies the worker for (sic) making a successful bargain, 
and if the employer were everywhere at liberty to take men for 
what, under such pressure, they might individually offer to 
work for, he might get them for very little” (Clark 1913, 
292). 
  If employees could store their labor at zero cost or, in 
what comes analytically to the same thing, if labor simply had 
no unmet needs, its bargaining power would be substantially 
enhanced.  The ability to withdraw, if only for a short 
period, from the market enables employees to refuse an offer 
that is on the table while negotiating or searching for a 
better one.  Being forced, through unmet needs, to accept a 
“take-it-or-leave-it” offer implies that a worker has little 
bargaining power and for that reason a reduced chance of being 
paid the full value of their labor.  As John Bates Clark 
observed long ago, “Workers have something to sell, and they 
must be able to withhold it if they are to have an effective 
voice in fixing the price that they will get” (Clark 1902, 
553).5  Liberals, particularly those whose ideas once 
influenced the Democratic Party, understood Clark’s point.  
Take, as an example, the following passage from President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 1944 "State of the Union" address: 
<<BEGINEXT 
We have come to a clearer realization of the fact, 
however, that true individual freedom cannot exist 
without economic security and independence. 
“Necessitous men are not free men.”  People who are   11
hungry, people who are out of a job are the stuff of 
which dictatorships are made (Roosevelt, 1944, 87). 
<<ENDEXT 
  As it is unlikely that labor will ever experience zero 
storage costs, a reasonable alternative in a market-oriented 
society is a policy of full employment.  Workers will still 
require a job paying a living wage to ensure that their needs 
are met, but with full employment the threat to quit a 
position becomes more credible, thereby increasing the 
bargaining power of actual and potential employees.6 
  Once the role of the “free entry and exit” assumption so 
characteristic of orthodox labor economics is understood, it 
becomes apparent that it is anything but an innocent 
“simplifying assumption.”  Rather it is a substantive 
assumption, in the sense that much of what passes for 
“knowledge” about the operation, efficiency, and fairness of 
contemporary labor markets is based upon it.  Without full 
employment, relative bargaining power becomes a crucial 
determinant of the market process.  It follows that policies 
derived from an ill-considered presumption of full employment 
must be rethought and even reconsidered if the facts do not 
support that assumption.  At the most abstract level there is 
a simple and direct lesson in all of the above.  In an economy 
without full employment it is relative bargaining power, not 
“skills” or “productivity,” that determines the wage 
structure.  Moreover, supply and demand models that implicitly 
assume full employment necessarily obscure this fundamental   12
reality and for that reason can lead us to erroneous 
conclusions and flawed policies. 
 
Labor Embodies the Quality of Self-Consciousness 
 
  A third characteristic specific to labor that is often 
ignored is our capacity for reflection or self-consciousness 
(Frankfurt 1971).  This capacity, when considered at all by 
mainstream economists, is subsumed in a narrow and highly 
constrained manner under the “labor-leisure tradeoff” that is 
thought to determine the labor supply decision.  This approach 
posits that people hold fixed attitudes regarding the relative 
merits of leisure versus additional income.  Moreover, these 
views are thought to be determined prior to an employee's 
entry into the labor market, and are limited to a 
determination of the willingness of each laborer to supply a 
given quantity of labor at any given real wage.  Whatever the 
merits of this approach when economists are formulating a 
theory of consumption, when it comes to labor markets, this 
perspective necessarily sets aside the importance of our 
capacity for independent assessment and reflection on our 
experiences in the labor market or at our place of work.  This 
is a crucial, if conventional, oversight. 
  Despite the wishful and misguided hopes of generations of 
Taylorist employers, labor is distinctly not a "tool" in the 
sense of a passive implement that can be utilized or not at 
the discretion of its purchaser.  Experience and introspection   13
suggest that perceived fairness and quality of treatment on 
the job can be as important as monetary compensation in 
eliciting employee loyalty and effort.  Our capacity for 
reflection enables each of us to consider, and make judgments, 
concerning the qualities of a given place of employment.  Such 
judgments have implications for how, and even if, we will 
continue to work at a particular job or location.  By 
contrast, a capacity for reflection is not commonly associated 
with broccoli, fruit, bags of concrete, or other marketable 
commodities.  While it would be unwise to suppose that our 
capacity for reflection is regularly or routinely exercised, 
we should nevertheless be wary of economic theories that 
altogether ignore it, especially in the event that widely-held 
norms of fair play are being openly flaunted.7 
  In general, assuming that individuals maximize across a 
fixed utility mapping is an overly static foundation for 
capturing the complex idea of reflection.  We know that people 
do act, even in cases when the facts of a given situation make 
action costly, dangerous, irresponsible, or unwise.  Labor 
history, to say nothing of military or entrepreneurial 
history, is full of people making expensive or risky choices 
simply because it was the “right thing” to do.8 
  Reflection or self-consciousness is unique to the 
productive input called labor.9  It is clear that broccoli or 
a bag of concrete can not have an aesthetic, moral, or any 
other attitude or response to how it is treated or thinks it 
is being treated.  A bag of concrete will not think it is   14
unfair if it is fully used up before another bag is even 
opened.  Broccoli will not feel violated or cheapened if it is 
given away to someone else.  As the late economist Alfred 
Eichner so wonderfully stated, "It is a matter of indifference 
to the barrel of oil that is sold whether it is used to heat a 
house of God or a house of prostitution" (Eichner 1985, 79; 
see also Marshall 1920, 471).  People, on the other hand, do 
show up to work with a developed sense of right and wrong in 
conjunction with a set of experiences, ideas, and expectations 
concerning the job they have been asked to do.  Management 
must either modify, work with, or confront these norms and 
expectations.  They rarely have the option of ignoring them 
altogether, as these attitudes will directly affect the 
quality and quantity of work that they can get from a given 
labor force.  Collectively, the factors considered in this 
paragraph suggest a partial answer to why management is, and 
should, be taught in a different department from operations 
research. 
  Now, we know that horses, mules and camels also have the 
quality of consciousness.  They even exhibit “learned 
behavior.”  But it would be a stretch to argue that they 
“reflect” on their surroundings or draw larger meanings from 
what they have been asked to do.  While I am not prepared to 
present a treatise on the origin and meaning of reflection in 
juxtaposition to consciousness, I am confident that most 
understandings of these terms would acknowledge that the idea 
of reflection, drawing as it does on the ideas of learning,   15
context, and time to make judgments, is somewhat unique to 
adult human beings (Frankfurt 1971).10 
  In labor markets, and labor relations within a firm, the 
fact of reflection makes an enormous difference.  For example, 
in the contemporary United States the cultural understanding 
that we label "common sense" supports the norm of “equal pay 
for equal work” for all of the employees of any given 
establishment.  Yet it is obvious that a machine or a mule 
would not object if you paid less for its services than you 
did for another, identical, machine or mule.  People will 
object to such treatment unless a compelling reason is offered 
that satisfies their sense of justice.  For example seniority 
is widely considered to be a valid reason to pay one person 
more than another for the same work.11 
  Drawing upon such considerations John Maynard Keynes and 
Neo-Institutionalists such as Frank Pierson, Clark Kerr, and 
John Dunlop, among others, observed that some of the value 
that workers place on their wage is its level relative to 
others in the same workplace or industry (Keynes 1936, 4-22; 
Taylor and Pierson 1957, 3-31; Kaufman 1993, 75-102).  These 
theorists built upon the simple observation that a person's 
compensation is often deemed satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
depending upon the structure of the wage bargain and how much 
comparable workers are paid.  Professional arbitrators and 
other labor relations experts know that within every firm and 
even industry there is not simply a wage, but a wage hierarchy 
that guides and reinforces expectations concerning relative   16
wages.  John Dunlop developed his idea of "job clusters" and 
"wage contours" to illustrate some of these dynamics (Dunlop 
1957).  Smart managers know that they should avoid disturbing 
these hierarchies without a compelling reason.  This is 
because arbitrary wage adjustments that ignore the social and 
firm-level values implicit in an established wage structure 
can lead to a significant drop in morale, a strike, or other 
disruption in the smooth operation of the production process. 
  Indeed, the idea that people are beings with a capacity 
for reflection, and consequently have a concern for their 
treatment and status at their place of work, points to the 
role that effective organization can play as a factor in 
economic production.  These ideas, combined with some 
frustration with mainstream labor economics as a field of 
research, contributed to the development of Industrial 
Relations as an independent field of scholarship and 
professional activity (Kaufman 1993, 75-102).  Collectively, 
these insights have been the basis for several important 
studies of the role of organization in the development of 
modern economies (Lazonick 1991; Chandler 1977, 1962). 
 
The Relationship of High Productivity to High Wages 
 
  One reason for the popularity and widespread acceptance 
of the supply and demand theory of price and wage 
determination is its simplicity.  Certainly it has the 
rhetorical advantage of a “one size fits all” quality to it.    17
This venerable theory features only two equations, the supply 
and demand schedules respectively, and two unknowns, the 
equilibrium real wage and quantity of labor bought.  In this 
theory, labor supply is determined by the “income-leisure 
tradeoff” implicit in the decision-making of every potential 
laborer, and is derived from the marginal disutility of labor.  
Demand is derived from the marginal product of labor.12 
  A fundamental problem with the supply and demand theory, 
as it is conventionally applied to the labor market, is 
somewhat elementary.  If the marginal product of labor 
schedule is at least partially determined by the wage level 
then the model may no longer be said to feature a unique 
equilibrium solution.  As it happens there are several good 
reasons to believe that labor’s productivity, and hence 
marginal productivity, is related to the level of wages.  As 
previously mentioned, the capacity for self-consciousness 
suggests that people can work at several different levels of 
effort while on the same job.  Couched in the anthropologists' 
language of “gift exchange,” economists such as George Akerlof 
have argued that improved wages and workplace conditions can 
enhance workers' morale, thereby improving performance and 
lowering the costs associated with turnover (Akerlof 1982).  
Alternatively, with a higher wage a firm's workforce may enjoy 
"employment rents" that, in turn, generate an incentive to 
provide a greater effort while on the job (Bowles 1985; 
Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).  Finally, higher wages may   18
contribute to greater workplace performance through improved 
health and physical well-being (Leibenstein 1963). 
  Despite the important, and widely known, literature 
surveyed in the previous paragraph, mainstream economists 
retain their commitment to the marginal product theory of 
distribution with its corollary that a high level of marginal 
productivity is the fundamental cause of high wages.  Yet, and 
in part because of the research described above, it is not too 
difficult to argue that the direction of causation runs both 
ways. 
  The causal argument that attributes high wages to high 
marginal productivity will not be reviewed here as it is 
familiar to us all -- basically, "highly-skilled" labor earns 
a scarcity premium.  As to the argument being developed here, 
that high wages contribute to high productivity, there are two 
basic points to be made.  First, as economists as diverse as 
Adam Smith (1976, 72-97), Harvey Leibenstein (1963), David 
Gordon (1996), and the several "efficiency-wage" theorists 
referenced above have argued, there is a causal link that runs 
from high wages to high productivity.  The reasons, again, are 
that high wages lead to greater effort, greater willingness to 
learn, improved morale, and lower turnover.  Additionally, 
they can induce greater productivity within the firm by 
forcing firms to reduce inefficiency within management and the 
process of production (Altman 2001).  I should add that these 
several arguments were widely understood and accepted by the   19
mainstream of American economists during the Progressive Era 
(Prasch 1998; 1999a). 
  Second, goods can be more readily sold in a high wage 
economy and, of course, high wage jobs with substantial 
benefits can be offered when a firm operates in a prosperous 
and growing economy.  If the market is large and, as a 
consequence, the division of labor can be greatly advanced, we 
can expect the high productivity that facilitates the payment 
of high wages.  But notice the caveat.  This can only be the 
case if the market is large and already features high incomes.  
A poor country does not have a large market, even if there are 
a lot of hard-working and resourceful people in residence.  
The fact is that goods must be in demand if the market is to 
be large, and demand is a function of both the desire for 
goods and the incomes of potential consumers.  It is for this 
reason that we find ourselves in a theoretical dilemma that 
resembles that of the proverbial "chicken and egg."  High 
wages lead to the possibility of a high productivity economy, 
and high productivity results in high wages. 
  For this reason, American trade policy is a legitimate 
public concern since an important consequence of losing well 
paid manufacturing jobs is the erosion of our high wage 
economy, and with it, the erosion of our large internal market 
for consumer products.  Now these causal relationships are not 
immediately apparent to the individuals or firms making 
everyday decisions in the marketplace.  Any given firm's 
contribution to the purchasing power of the American labor   20
force is rather limited.  It follows that firms have an ever-
present incentive to reduce their own wage bill, while 
continuing to sell their goods in the high wage American 
market.  Clearly, if all firms simultaneously pursue this 
strategy, and the aggregate market shrinks, every firm will 
experience a decline in revenues.  As revenues fall off, the 
measured rate of productivity growth will also decline or 
stagnate, independently of the level of "skills" or "work 
ethic" that we may, or may not, wish to ascribe to a 
particular nation's workforce (Prasch 1999c; 1996). 
  When the events described in the previous paragraph 
transpire we are typically treated to the sight of orthodox 
economists with life-time job security proclaiming that since 
productivity growth is declining, labor market "flexibility" 
is needed to restore the "competitiveness" of the economy.  As 
these economists tell us, it is just "common sense."13  The 
problem with this “common sense” vision is that it examines 
the magnitude of the wage bill from the perspective of the 
isolated employer -- where wages are viewed exclusively as an 
element of a firm's costs.  It forgets that as income, wages 
are the most important component of the expenditure stream.  
Put simply, each firm's wages represent, when spent by 
employees, the revenue of some other firms.  Low or falling 
wages are a threat to these revenues and the high wage economy 
that a substantial revenue stream can support. 
 
High Wages are Not a Problem.  They are the Objective.   21
 
  One might have hoped that the idea expressed in this 
heading would not require an extended argument.  Regrettably, 
contemporary discussions of economic theory and policy, imbued 
as they are with a "business" or "common sense" perspective, 
tend to overlook it.  To some extent this is because 
discussions in the business-oriented media are generally, if 
subconsciously, imbued with a perspective that largely 
reflects rentier interests.  As a result, rising wages and 
levels of employment are often viewed as an inflationary 
threat to the economy, to be resisted by restrictive monetary 
policy (Thurow 1996).  Before he embraced the rhetoric of the 
so-called New Economy, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
shared this same bias.  To combat the supposed evils 
associated with a non-zero rate of inflation Greenspan, to the 
applause of mainstream economists and financiers, adjusted the 
short-term rate of interest in an effort to trim increases in 
employee compensation in addition to keeping the overall level 
of employment close to a mythical "natural rate"  (Galbraith 
1998, 171-182).  Unfortunately, the business press, the Fed, 
and too many economists, have forgotten the simple point 
enunciated so long ago by Adam Smith: 
<<BEGINEXT 
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of 
which the far greater part of the members are poor 
and miserable.  It is but equity, besides, that they 
who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body of the 
people, should have such a share of the produce of 
their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well 
fed, cloathed and lodged (Smith, 1776/1976, 88).   22
<<ENDEXT 
  Such sentiments have important implications.  Clearly it 
is a sign of progress in economic affairs if the prices of 
commodities fall over time.  Machinery, better management, 
innovation and improved techniques are all ostensibly aimed at 
improving our quality of life through the successive 
cheapening of commodities.  Clearly lower labor-costs per unit 
of output over time are a sign of progress in commercial 
affairs.  But it should matter to us if this latter result 
occurs through innovation or from a general reduction in 
wages, although from the perspective of the firms involved 




  In light of the above, it is reasonable to conclude that 
labor markets are different from other markets in tangible 
ways that matter to the social scientific project we call 
economics.  That this proposition, and its implications, have 
long been understood is evident in the response of Barbara 
Grimes, a Law Professor at the University of California, to a 
United States Supreme Court decision overturning minimum wage 
legislation in 1923: 
<<BEGINEXT 
Human labor is not a mere commodity to be bartered 
and sold.  It is the essence of human life itself.  
And because the conditions relating to the sale of 
labor, the performance of labor and the mode of 
payment of labor, have important social results 
expressed in terms of social well being or ill   23
being, the liberty of contract in regard to the sale 
of labor has been repeatedly interfered with by 
legislative enactment in the valid exercise of the 
police power and as such sustained by the highest 
courts of the land (Grimes 1925, 117-118). 
<<ENDEXT 
  Despite the theoretical currents of much of the past 
fifty years, differences between labor and commodities such as 
broccoli, fruit, or bags of concrete should not be dismissed 
by economists as “normative" and for that reason irrelevant to 
economic theorists.  Because labor cannot be separated from 
its providers, cannot be stored by its providers, and embodies 
the capacity for reflection, it is evident that labor markets 
are prone to their own unique dynamics.  These realities, 
individually and collectively, provide an important economic 
explanation for the often contentious evolution of labor law 
over the past several centuries (Steinfeld 2001).  
Additionally, we must recall that labor is the one "factor of 
production" that most of us wish, in the end, to see well-
compensated. 
  Finally, economists risk a great deal of error when they 
suppose, in the name of "simplicity," or "mathematical 
elegance," that labor should be theorized along the lines of 
an abstract, inanimate, commodity.  That labor is neither 
inanimate nor "just another commodity" was once well 
understood by economists.  It follows that what is needed is 
not a project of discovery, so much as one of recovery.  Once 
this recovery is accomplished, we will find out what we once 
knew -- that labor has unique features that are of great   24
consequence to the project of theory construction, policy 
formulation, and the revival of economics as a thoughtful and 




1. While a few economists, such as James K. Galbraith 
(1997) and Robert Kuttner (1997, 68-109) have presented 
contrary views, the treatment of labor as "just another 
commodity" is simply taken for granted by the mainstream 
of contemporary economists.  However the historical 
record indicates that the commodification of labor was 
actually the result of a specific historical process.  As 
Karl Polanyi pointed out, "To separate labor from other 
activities of life and to subject it to the laws of the 
market was to annihilate all organic forms of existence 
and to replace them by a different type of organization, 
an atomistic and individualistic one" (Polanyi 1944, 
163).  For this reason he considered labor to be one of 
several "fictitious" commodities that were necessary for 
capitalism to emerge as a social system (Polanyi 1944, 
68-76).  For a recent and compelling presentation of the 
development and economic importance of the fictitious 
commodities traded in commodities markets see William 
Cronon, "Pricing the Future: Grain" (Cronon, 1991, 97-
147).  On the historical evolution of the labor contract   25
in England and the United States see Robert Steinfeld 
(2001). 
 
2. I, along with most thinking people, understand that any 
theory must abstract from the particulars of the existent 
situation if it is to be of value.  The trouble is that 
this point is often presented as a blanket defense of a 
specific set of abstractions -- those of the Neoclassical 
school of economics.  What is neglected is that there is 
an "art" behind the formulation of abstractions.  
Specifically, to construct a plausible theory, we must 
not abstract from the essential characteristics of a 
particular problem or situation and thereby distort, 
rather than simplify, the phenomena we are investigating. 
 
3. Arguing that the category of "needs" was economically 
meaningless used to be a cornerstone of economics 
instruction in the early 1980s (cf. Heyne 1983, 16-32).  
It is evocative, in light of the World Bank's recent and 
aggressive initiative to privatize the provision of water 
in Third World countries, that Paul Heyne used the 
example of water to illustrate his point.  Today's 
textbooks strongly imply or suggest that needs do not 
exist, but the language employed is not as 
confrontational as it was twenty years ago. 
   26
4. A detailed and disturbing survey of academic studies of 
the causal relationship between downward mobility and 
various social problems such as alcoholism, teen 
pregnancy, and divorce is presented in David Gordon 
(1996, ch. 5). 
 
5. Some readers have remarked on the apparent irony of 
these several quotations from John Bates Clark in light 
of his being the first to articulate the marginal product 
theory of distribution.  However, reading Clark's theory 
of distribution in the context of his more policy-
oriented essays confirms that he clearly thought that the 
specific structure of any particular market could modify 
the generalizability of his theory of distribution 
(Prasch 2000a, 2002; Clark 1902, 2002).  To Clark, unlike 
the positivists who later adopted and deployed his theory 
of distribution, the realism of ones initial assumptions 
mattered on both ethical and policy grounds. 
 
6. For a bold suggestion as to how full employment could be 
achieved without causing undue government expenditure or 
inflationary pressures see Philip Harvey (1989) or L. 
Randall Wray (1998, 122-154).  Despite the revenues that 
business can be assured of when workers are flush with 
good wages we can expect well-organized and financed 
objections to such a policy.  The reason is that 
management prerogatives are difficult to impose when   27
employees have a credible threat to quit (Kalecki 1971, 
138-145).  Moreover, high levels of employment provide 
the material foundation for cultural changes that social 
conservatives object to.  For example, sustained periods 
of high employment and rising wages, such as occurred in 
the 1940s and 1960s, provided more independence for 
women, minorities, and teenage children.  What followed 
was an erosion of what are called “traditional” morals.  
The short of it is that in market societies, people are 
as free as they can afford to be -- rising employment 
rates increase people’s sense of freedom, but reduce the 
prerogatives of those at the top of the social and 
economic hierarchy.  Thus the genuine and heartfelt sense 
of alarm evinced by cultural conservatives and plutocrats 
during sustained periods of prosperity. 
 
7. The recent rise of "agency theory" is an effort to 
retrieve an aspect of this issue.  Limited as it is by 
its "economistic" preconceptions, it nevertheless is an 
important attempt by mainstream economic theorists to 
recover some of the understanding that was lost during 
the drive to transform economic theory into a purely 
atomistic and analytic field of study in the post-war 
period. 
 
8. Besides history, psychology and literature, recent work 
in evolutionary and experimental economics affirms that   28
people will sacrifice earnings to enforce norms of 
fairness (cf. Carpenter 2002; Carpenter, Matthews and 
Ong'ong'a 2003). 
 
9. Given my seemingly chronic mishaps, I do sometimes 
harbor a suspicion that computers also have a capacity 
for independent reflection and decision-making. 
 
10. Indeed, it is precisely because children are thought to 
be lacking a sense of context and a developed capacity 
for reflection that we do not grant them the legal rights 
and responsibilities that we conventionally extend to 
adults. 
 
11. As is well known, for much of American labor history 
gender or race were widely taken to be valid reasons for 
discrepancies in opportunity or pay within the same 
workplace.  Happily, these flawed conventions have become 
less legitimate over the past century (Figart, Mutari, 
and Power 2002, 16-33). 
 
12. John Maynard Keynes severely, and properly, criticized 
the proposition that the marginal disutility of labor 
determined the aggregate labor supply schedule (1936, 4-
22).  Additionally, this proposition can be challenged on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds even if we 
disregard "macro" considerations (Derobert 2001; Prasch   29
2000b; Sharif 2003).  The second assumption, that the 
demand for labor is dependent upon the marginal product 
of labor, was undermined by the capital controversies of 
the 1950s and 1960s (Hunt and Schwartz 1972; Harcourt 
1972).  While each of these several critiques is 
interesting, reviewing them here would take us too far 
afield from the topic of this essay. 
 
13. I will note, since I have checked, that the economists 
making such pronouncements generally perceive calls for 
“flexibility” in their own compensation or terms of 
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